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Theatres of the Book: 
Covering, Flaunting, Marketing, 
Author and Text
Peter Goodrich1
What was required of me was the skill to play my role and not 
compromise myself (Seignalt 1797/1978: vol 3 108).
The printing of theatre — theatrum imprimatur, just to flaunt a little — 
was accompanied by a theatricalisation of print. The new technology 
of the production of books brought with it not only an exponentially 
greater quantity, but also an increased visibility, of scholarly works and 
religious and legal texts particularly. Pamphlets, typescripts, books 
flooded the markets and were everywhere on view. Early print also 
had a striking dimension of performance and play. Aviaries of angels 
and other devotional and instructional figures adorned the religious 
manuals and modelled the proper persona, the ontic self, that the subject 
should play. Early law texts had coloured graphics, emblems, ‘devises’, 
as well as schemata, charts, portraits and mottos. Legal being too had 
its visible and printed figures, the image of the apposite propositus 
that accompanied the ceremonies of the norm and their demands for 
honour and role. The lectoral ‘contentment of sight’ made the book 
into a species of theatre, and law itself had its tradition of drama, as 
also of justice, both seen and unseeing. To these relatively well known 
dimensions of visibility and theatricality I will here add a footnote 
concerning the book as cover and covering, as expression and occlusion 
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of the drama of the juristic self. My specific topic and illustration will 
be the cover of a singular book on Covering by the lawyer poet Kenji 
Yoshino (2006). The analysis offered will address the jacket picture(s), 
title and blurbs, the cover viewed as text become figure and thus as the 
first and emblematic image — in filmic terms the opening credits — 
which catch the eye, attract or repel, but seldom gain the analysis that 
such crucial clothing, such flagrant flaunting, merits.
Covers
Interestingly enough, the cover is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Historically books were bound, frequently by the purchaser, in vellum 
and then board. Originally likely to be wrapped in lawyer’s whethers 
(sheepskin), and sometimes pigskin, they were later most often simply 
encased between plain panels. There might be some pattern engraved 
along the edges of the leather or stamped in the centre of the board, 
larger books would have metal clasps or leather ties, but from the 
Gutenberg Bible to the earliest legal incunabula, from Shakespeare’s 
various folio editions to Blackstone’s Commentaries, the colours and 
curlicues, images, emblems and other illuminations were kept for the 
inside of the work. The earliest cover in the modern sense of the dust 
jacket or exterior image dates to 1825 and was used for the collected 
works of Voltaire, or so we are informed by Gerard Genette in his 
curious study of Paratexts, meaning the marginalia of publication 
(Genette 2004: 22-4). The ‘blank leather’ of the classical binding 
gave way in the nineteenth century to a plethora of printed covers 
which included anything from the author’s signature to their portrait, 
dedications, mottos, emblems, title, subtitles, names, numbers, date 
and price (Genette 2004: 24).
The cover then is one feature of the marginalia of book production, 
one of the miscellaneous thresholds to publication and, although it is 
not generally remarked in scholarly discourse, it does form a genre of 
sorts, a body of statements both visual and graphic that have their own 
rhetoric and significance. The cover in fact replaced the frontispiece 
image which in early printed texts was most often some species of 
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emblem or heraldic device on the opening page. The title page would 
often be in part in coloured ink, with multiple typefaces, and Latin 
mottos. Thus the 1610 edition of John Selden’s Jani Anglorum facies 
altera has an image of the juridical deity Janus (a two-faced figure) 
with a Latin motto on the title page (Selden 1610).2 It is a significant 
emblem of the work and, although it might seem an incidental 
feature, accurately depicts, in image and motto, the radical character 
of the book. Jani Anglorum is an account of the feminine sources of 
common law, a work that uncovers hidden dimensions of Anglican 
law’s interior and affective roots in a gynococratic past and in Druidic 
rites and communities. The image that acts as the face of the tract also 
implies the importance of the image as face. It is the frontispiece and 
so it is the first sign, a flaunting which announces the visible themes 
of the book which it fronts. The cover plays a comparable but more 
ambivalent role in that the mystery of the frontispiece, of the emblem 
veiled by boards, hidden inside the bindings, protected by fascia is 
now demoted and placed outside as a disposable and sometimes 
dispensable image, a mere cover.3
The most famous example of the frontispiece engraving, however, is 
the emblem of Leviathan at the opening of Thomas Hobbes’ eponymous 
treatise (1651). The image is that of the crowned sovereign, sword in one 
hand, staff in the other, looming over a landscape, in the foreground of 
which are a cathedral and a city. In the printed edition, the sovereign’s 
torso, except for the hands, as is well known, is composed entirely of 
his subjects, all turned away from the viewer and obediently looking 
towards the sovereign’s face. Many are kneeling. The image is both 
striking and somewhat opaque. The sovereign rises up and dominates 
the landscape, his body populous and vast, whereas the kingdom, the 
realm surveyed, consists only of neatly placed villages, prominent 
churches and then, at the front, the well-ordered, indeed thoroughly 
regimented, geometrically proportioned city. The significant point, 
visually, is that there are only buildings: the landscape and walled, 
castellated city are strikingly empty of people. Deserted. Blank.4 For 
the author of the image, humanity is definitively elsewhere. The people 
are not even on the ground but rather swept up, aloft, in the air, as 
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the constituent parts and members of the sovereign body, Behemoth, 
Juggernaut and, here, Leviathan. It is a powerful and lasting image of 
sovereignty as governance that stands over us, watches and threatens an 
absolute judgment. The sovereign is the embodiment of law, the corpus 
iuris, father and judge, guide and arbiter of the social. Indeed much 
more can be said about this emblematic image, but it will have to wait.
The significance of Hobbes’ frontispiece is initially to be found 
in its theoretical insignificance. It is, relatively speaking, a popular 
emblem but it has not gained much in the way of jurisprudential or 
substantive doctrinal elaboration. It is mentioned, it may even be 
viewed as aesthetically interesting, but it is not treatise, norm, polity 
or law. To this we can add that it is also and frequently now used, 
in whole or more usually in part, as the cover or dust flap image of 
contemporary editions of Leviathan (Hobbes 1978 edn).5 Here is an 
oddity or visual bagatelle that may help publishers sell the work and so 
it makes the passage, quite literally from interior to exterior, from title 
page to dust jacket, from frontispiece of the work to disposable cover 
or, in the case of a paperback, to the incidental marking of the soft 
jacket. Here though, and already, we can note the other significance 
of this passage and trajectory. The movement of the image, and of the 
iconographic message it portrays, from title page to cover already marks 
an exteriorisation of the interior, a ‘coming out’ as it were, that fits well 
with the dual thematic of covering as both exposing and concealing, 
adorning and draping.
It is maybe because the shift from the interior image to the outside 
cover seems obvious, a merely technological achievement, that it gains 
little recognition. The interior image is somehow treated as if it is 
dismissed to the cover, and so expressly moved out of the work. It is 
somehow too trivial to be remarked, too evident to be addressed directly, 
too marginal to be taken seriously. And so it is already something of a 
lost genre. If I analyse it here, it is in part for fear that the image on the 
dust jacket gets lost in the passage to the library and the processing that 
leads to the shelving of books according to one or other of the numerical 
systems of classification that archivists use and electronic filing mimics.6 
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There is a start, an effort of preservation that counters the discarding of 
the dust jacket in the public repositories of books, presumably because 
the cover is simply a cover, a protection, a way of fending off external 
threats to the integrity of the text, which is now safely embedded and 
likely vegetating in the stacks. The cover, in this dismissive modern 
interpretation, is simply part of the detritus of publicity, a symptom 
of advertising, a piece of trivia to be discarded like wrapping paper in 
favour of the seriousness of the gift and missive within. Something 
like that, but this general and not particularly conscious discounting 
of the cover image is deeply ironic if one recalls that the cover image 
is in fact an interior image that has been placed on the exterior, the 
first or original sign of the inside moved inadvertently and precariously 
to the outside. It is an emblem of the work, its face, its effigy and so 
in many respects its exemplary sign, and yet it is a sign that ironically 
gets mislaid, discarded or itself concealed.
To this can be added that covering itself suggests something 
obscured, the intrusive rather than the obtrusive or as Robert Burton 
has it in the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy: ‘when you see the 
cover, why ask about the thing hidden? It was covered, because he 
should not know what was in it’ (Burton 1628: 11). Here we can revert 
to the first of the historical significances of covering, a root meaning 
according to which it is a corpse that is covered with a mantle (corpus 
pallio), and in our case the corpus is the work, what Walter Benjamin 
appropriately enough viewed as being itself the death mask of its 
author’s intention. The cover is occlusive. It shrouds and veils. It is 
a mantle and serves primarily to cloak. And not in the swaddling 
clothes of nascence but in the wrapping of the desiccated body. 
Indeed, in Egyptian practices of mummification, preservation of the 
soul through careful embalming of the body was not completed until 
the corpse was wrapped elaborately in linen. We inherit this sense of 
a link between covering and mortification in the specifically juridical 
concept of the permanence of the legal text, in its addressing not the 
contemporary but posterity. Law lives on through its unchanging black 
letters, fixed in Gothic script, collected in gargantuan folds, covered 
and embalmed in the library. The plea rolls and the tables of fines, the 
362
Goodrich
cases and other books of the law, collectively still termed the corpus 
iuris, make reference, if suitably veiled, to a body, a corpse and hence 
also something shrouded, covered, mute and awaiting resurrection. 
Lex est mutus magistratus we are told by the early lawyers, it is a silent 
judge, it is inanimate, without breath, a dead letter until it finds its 
tongue, its poet, its majesty. This, of course, is where the poet lawyer, 
historically speaking the gay scientist, Professor Yoshino and his recent 
enough work on Covering reluctantly enters the stage.7
Covering
Figure 1 The front cover of Kenji Yoshino’s Covering: The Hidden Assault 
on Our Civil Rights. Copyright © 2006 by Random House Inc. Used by 
permission of Random House Limited.
Start with the cover of Covering. A simple nominal choice not only 
because books uncover, which is to say they provide a space to unleash 
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in a displaced form a self that likely cannot appear in everyday speech, 
but also because they have a cover. So if we turn, and why not play 
the literalist for a moment, to the cover of Covering, the inside on 
the outside, we can immediately note the sepulchral half tones, the 
monochrome of the image. [See Figure 1.] The front cover picture 
is in the form of a black and white photograph in which half of the 
author’s face is shown in a sepia style portrait, folding out of the cover, 
while the rest is blank, bare tablet, a palimpsest grey — fusion of black 
and white, paper and text. Over this ambiguous space the title of the 
book is printed in lower case letters in lavender. The subtitle is in white 
lettering, small caps. The author’s name is in mellow yellow, mainly 
lower case, pacific rim. If we spare the modern commercial publisher 
the aspersion of too great a degree of subtlety, the grey on grey is the 
Hegelian mark of indefinition, of things hidden, of identity covered 
or obscured, shadow at dusk. In the heraldic law of colour, suitably 
updated, the lavender is an ironic index of invention, the purple thread 
of sovereignty or emendation of law to which the gay identity that is 
covered by the word ‘covering’ undoubtedly refers. And the yellow is 
the mark of the orient, of the sensei or teacher. To this, another initial 
indicator of the image can be added, namely that the letters and the 
colours cover the figure, the face of the author himself. His visage is 
partially obscured, driven into the background by the lettering — the 
branding one might reasonably opine — by the purple prose, by the 
assault on law to which the subtitle refers. The cover as shroud upon 
a corpse gives way to the mantle or cloak of the traveller, of the being 
that subsists and moves behind the cover. This is Milton’s mantle from 
the last line of Lycidas (Milton 1891: 74):
At last he rose, and twitch’d his mantle blue: 
To-morrow to fresh woods and pastures new.
The mantle blue, in this case a lavender blue, both signifies and hides 
a melancholic body, a covered soul. The melancholia of law has to be 
twitched and moved along. The work of which this is the title page, 
the cover, may be marked initially by a certain quietude, soft tones, 
and a partial invisibility or at least obscurity that accurately reflects 
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the narrative in the pages ahead where colour will dawn and law will 
be rewritten slowly yet in a more diverse hue.
Recto and verso, front cover and reverse cover. And so, moving 
on, consider first, recto, oratio recto, direct speech, frontal visage, the 
shroud. The background, the non-verbal is what is both torn and 
hidden, but look closer, look behind the text and there is a stylised 
effigy or imprint of the mask, the legal body, the persona or face. Not 
any face and not a whole face. Half a face and if, as lawyers have long 
dictated, the face is the mirror of the soul, vultus est index animi, then 
this is a split visage, an image rent in two (Head 1656: 53).8 One eye, 
one nostril, one ear, one corner of the mouth, one cheek all suggest 
what used to be termed a broken face. It is a collapsed face, one that 
has lost its form, it is colourless and, by extension, covered or veiled. 
It is classically a feminine face and signals at first viewing a downcast, 
obedient, reverent image, one that does not look directly into the eye of 
the auditor, judge or reader. It is a face that does not confront authority, 
one which neither attracts nor incites desire. But the half face on the 
cover is not looking with downcast eyes.
The paradox of this effaced face is caught in the placement of the 
‘g’ of ‘covering’ directly over the eye, as if a monocle or, less poetically, 
half of a spectacle through which the eye stares out. The spectacle is 
perhaps too obviously the ‘g’ of gayness, the subject here staring with 
one eye through the partial lens of sexual orientation. So too it is a 
pirate’s gaze — fixed, defiant almost — smiling out. The top half of 
the ‘g’ in minion (mignon) typeface forms a circle with a suitably bent 
curlicue extending from the top right corner. The sign of masculinity 
but with the arrow of virility shortened, softened, in lavender and 
literally bent. To this, note finally the more antique visual archive 
to which this image perhaps inadvertently refers: the emblem of the 
Anglican Church — the sign of its constitution and presence was an 
eye enclosed in a triangular or even pyramidal shape. That image of 
Anglican foundation, which was also highly controversial at the time 
of its original inscription, when greater attention was paid to images, 
is taken up and reformulated here as a partial image of a homosexual 
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constitution. The eye staring out of the ‘g’ is a symbol of a different 
masculinity, a lavender virility, a taking back of civic space.
Figure 2 The back outside cover of Kenji Yoshino’s Covering: The Hidden 
Assault on Our Civil Rights. Copyright © 2006 by Random House Inc. Used 
by permission of Random House Limited.
The image is of a partial concealment, it covers but is also a moment 
of reverse covering, of coming out. Indeed, turn to the reverse cover, the 
back-face of this Janus and the most immediately noticeable feature is 
that the face, the other half of the image from the front cover, is here 
tilted forward, more positive and persuasive, pressing to come out of the 
background and announce itself. Again, however, we must note that the 
face is covered. There are words printed over the image, but here they 
are snippets of laudation, ‘advance praise for covering’ [See Figure 2]. 
Praise of something before covering perhaps? Maybe advanced praise 
— high calibre, well educated laudation — the hyperbole of hierophants 
pasted to the back leaf. Hype. Encomia. White on grey. And final 
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irony, it suggests that covering should be praised, that we should flaunt 
it and, in flaunting we affirm, so much so that we could almost expect 
the opus to be a latter-day version of Fortescue’s foundational fifteenth 
century treatise In Praise of the Laws of England, adapted now — same 
tradition but new object of veneration — to the title De Laudibus legum 
tegumentae — In Praise of the Laws of Covering (Fortescue circa 1463).
It is unusual, I know and will say it again, to take the cover 
seriously. It is browsed, not read. But keep going. What precisely do the 
encomiasts have to say? What about the book is to be flaunted? Whose 
choice these blurbs on the back cover? Perhaps a brief conspectus, 
for the shame and the delight of it. First off, Adam Haslett says that 
‘Covering quite literally brings the law to life’. No covering, no law. So 
here, or so at least we may suspect, the life of the law is covering, not 
the ars moriendi or art of shrouding, of dying, but rather the rhetorical 
and highly figurative art of lawyering. So covering is necessary for law, 
indeed brings it to life, because without the theatre of covering, the life 
giving social art of playing the role of the lawyer, there would be no law. 
Lex animata or living law is only made possible by covering. There is 
a baroque coinage for this, theatrum veritatis et iustitiae, the theatre of 
justice and truth, and that is what Haslett offers as his advance praise 
following in an earlier if unknown juristic tradition (Baptista 1685). 
Which is at least curious because it makes covering sound essential and 
desirable. It is a good thing, we have no choice but to cover. Covering 
gives life to law and yet, for Yoshino, covering — as we know from 
the subtitle — is apparently a hidden assault on our civil rights, a bad 
thing, both painful and epistemically obstructive. Did Haslett get it 
wrong? Did he mean to? My suspicion is that Adam the novelist, and 
former classmate of Yoshino’s, and for sure I shouldn’t be mentioning 
such things, aimed at a productive misunderstanding of the lawyer. I 
suspect, worse still, that the novelist played the part of the lawyer and 
inadvertently suggested that Yoshino’s experience at law school was 
precisely the cost of admission, the price of bringing the law to life. 
They were at Yale together. Note further the title of Haslett’s book, 
cited on the back cover: You Are Not a Stranger Here. Grant that the 
citation gives the title a significance for Yoshino and for Covering and 
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we can conclude that Haslett is both praising Covering and noting in 
good novelistic style that covering, the art of creating fictional identities, 
is intrinsic to law, to the professions, and to the theatre of public life. 
That Yoshino is not a stranger here, indeed that he was Academic Dean 
at Yale Law School, the No.1 ranked legal academy in the US at the 
time of the book’s publication, suggests that he is neither a stranger, 
in alienam iuris as we say, nor an outsider, but rather a similar and sui 
iuris as in his own law. Otherwise, why suffer? Go be a professor of 
literature, a poet, a radical.
Then there is Koh. The first lawyer and last man offering advance 
praise. He is the only blurber identified exclusively by institutional 
affiliations rather than books written. Dean Koh, Kenji’s Dean, 
states with appropriate terseness that the book ‘should explode into 
America’s consciousness’. True it is tense and tautly written, precious 
prose, but I read it as softer and more melancholic than an explosion. 
In fact I suspect that the opposite is likely the case. Covering is not so 
much explosive, perhaps as Koh says it should be, but it is more gentle 
and insinuating than inflammatory or combustible. It offers tears not 
tinder, and more of a keg than a fuse. The question it poses at this 
point, in opposition to Koh’s normative ‘should’, is how to give it effect, 
short-term and longue durée. How is the intimate public sphere, the 
interior of the institution, to be made existentially safe, congenial and 
accessible to the aesthetics of gay identity, to the flaunting of alternate 
and plural aesthetic tastes and quotidian erotic self-expressions? What 
is needed is a significant change in the conversation, a shift to greater 
eloquence, to affective candour in the variegated existential spaces 
of collegial interaction, career survival, institutional advancement, 
in sum public decision-making great and small. The answer, at this 
point in the institutional history of law, is wrapped up in the question 
of covering itself.
The term implies a mixing of genres, the confluence of law and 
literature, the enfolding of autobiography and jurisprudence, poetry 
and rule, erotic and normative. There is as yet little eros in nomos, no 
erudition in eroticis in contemporary schools of legal theory, short 
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change for libido in the market economics of law (Nietzsche 1916: 53).9 
That said, Yoshino is implicitly committed to rectifying the imbalance 
in conjoining the literary and the legal, poetry and law. The poets too 
should be legislators, and in his view there is room to treat biography 
as the equal of doctrine and, hence, to allow a degree of reversion to 
the older meaning of gay science and its amatory law (Goodrich 2006). 
In that context, in the era of the fourteenth century revival of the 
troubadour tradition, the laws of love were the rhetorical rules of poetic 
composition and the best orators were picked as members of the Gay 
Consistory and as the judges of poetic tournaments (Goodrich 2003). 
The gay lawyer, to cite Rabelais, was sans culottes, a bare assed advocate, 
a viscerally learned figure (Rabelais 1696: 34). All of which is to say 
that autobiography opens up a novel space and arguably a more honest 
form of dialogue as to the demands that are made for conformity and 
covering. To the extent that autobiography is the enactment of the self, 
the emergence of ‘voice’, the actor taking to the stage, the very fact of 
inscribing experience — both trauma and desire — in a juridical text, 
simultaneously challenges the demand to cover and the conventional 
boundaries of legal method. It is a form of being bad, catachresis, a 
solecism that becomes a way of saying something new.
Such is the cover in terms of what Genette terms publishing 
thresholds. Front and back. Two sides of the face. Silent and voluble, 
image and text, the covered and the flaunted. What is there left to be 
said? Isn’t the topic of covering now covered by advance figures giving 
advanced praise? Time to drop the book and go out and do something 
about covering, blow the whistle, write the brief, call the lobbyist, 
contribute to the campaign fund, protest, rally, and rail against the 
exclusion of the light. But not quite so fast. Note if you will that pride of 
place in the flaunted encomia on the verso cover goes not to an academic, 
not to a law school dean, but to someone who is known principally as a 
novelist, even if he is undoubtedly teaching creative writing, the craft of 
fiction, literary self-organization, flower poetry or something similar at 
a college – Columbia University last I looked – to help pass the line. The 
figure of literature (and of the lex amicitia that comes with it) precedes 
the intonations of the scholarly, of the political and the legal. Pride of 
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place goes to questions of aesthetic discrimination, imagination and, by 
extension, the possibilities of alternative conversational styles, dialogue 
in different forms. To pursue this point of priority, to stick to the spirit 
if not the letter, the image and not simply the word of the cover, I will 
offer three additional commentaries, a triad of further connotations of 
covering and flaunting, a minor trinity, another scene.
Theatre and Flaunting
First, the dimensions of the issue. Yoshino is clear that we all cover. On 
the inside flap of the recto cover, in lavender letters, this ‘remarkable 
and elegant work’ which ‘fuses legal manifesto and poetic memoir’ 
begins its self-description with two words: ‘Everyone covers’. They 
hide disfavoured traits. Even angry straight white men have to cover 
(Yoshino 2006: 24). I cover. You cover. To this I will propose an 
additional and complementary thesis, an extension of the hypothesis, 
namely that all covering is erotic. This is especially so in common law 
terms. The word to cover comes from the Law French covert, meaning 
in a veiled or guarded manner, and refers legally to a femme covert, a 
married and so veiled woman. She loses her name, her capacity and 
personality. Her body becomes the usufruct of another, if I can put it 
like that, and who is going to stop me? Upon marriage, the husband 
covers the woman, but I am getting carried away. The doctrinal point 
is that she loses her law and is transferred in alienam familiam. She 
becomes the child of another. Why so covered? Why the veil? Why the 
lack of status that it signifies? According to Juan Luis Vives’s (1523) On 
the Instruction of Christian Women, the veil is the mark of ‘shamefastnes’, 
and this covering of the face signifies virtue and specifically chastity, 
‘in so much that she can not be chaste, that is not ashamed: for that is 
as a cover and a vayle of her face’ (Vives 1557: fol K i a). This text could 
be taken in many competing directions. For present purposes, the face 
is an image and images – and in that era of reformation and recusancy, 
with something of a vengeance -- incite desire. To veil the face is to 
cover the image and so mask desire. It is kept for the husband, for the 
man of whom the woman, the image, is a member. The covered face 
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signals purity and the counterposition of shame to love. What is for 
Christian doctrine shameful — the body, carnal lust, human desire — is 
veiled in favour of a purer passion, a spiritual love. The idol of the face, 
and the carnality it implies, is covered so as to hide the other scene of 
love, the body and its sexual functions.
Vives himself, as author of an instructional manual on early 
Christian forms of literal covering of the face and of desire, draws 
upon a much older patristic tradition. The most interesting and direct 
text expounding the Christian demand for covering is undoubtedly 
Tertullian On the Veiling of Virgins (1870). He argues that the face of 
the virgin threatens to fascinate, to magnetise, to lure to sin and for 
this reason she must veil it so as to block the pathway to temptation 
‘for who will have the audacity to intrude with eyes upon a shrouded 
face? A face without feeling? A face, so to say, morose?’ It is the last 
phrase that is most directly relevant because it invokes a law of erotic 
melancholy, a nomos of visceral sorrow, a gesture of corporeal erasure. 
That is the subject of covering, and while it maybe marks the wound 
that generates desire, I would like to think of it as a symptom, it gives 
expression to a melancholia that needs release, that must be properly 
mourned.
The law of the morose face, of erotic melancholy is the code for 
entry of the body into the social, it marks the rituals that accompany 
desire and at its best — as the law of love, and of amity — it addresses 
the space of erotic erudition, the discourse upon how we come to 
know and, over time to, love. To cover in this original common law 
meaning is to marry and by extension to join, to take up a place and 
role within a genealogy and family. For the femme covert this meant 
losing her identity, her name and, historically at least, her free will. 
She became subject to another. Those connotations are not entirely 
alien to Yoshino’s sense of taking up his place, his institutional role 
and pedagogic function in Law School. It is to that biographical path 
into the institution of law, together with the accompanying sense of 
existential loss of will and hiding of body and desire, that he devotes 
the better part of Covering.
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Here then, in law school, in its affective and often wounded spaces 
of reproduction, the successful student learns to become a master, to 
take on a mask, to play a role, to perform an identity that initially at 
least will likely seem to belong to another. For Yoshino, conscious 
of his own vulnerability, desperate to succeed, keen to pass largely 
unnoticed, the process involved trauma and attachment, covering and 
object choice. Thus, notable amongst adaptive techniques mentioned 
early in the narrative, he engages with a favourite professor’s text:
I also took to sleeping with his book. I would read it before falling 
asleep each night, and settle with my arms around it. In this time when 
everything was changing, this text would not change. The print would 
stay fixed on the pages, the words would say tomorrow what they said 
today (Yoshino 2006: 14).
The legal text reverts to the antique meaning of text as skin, as 
entanglement, both terror and desire. The black letters became an 
anchor, an object of love, a figure of authority, Pythagoras or here 
Bill Rubenstein, possessed through his words, undressed through 
his book.10 In embracing the text Yoshino provides an interesting 
and unwitting answer to the question posed by the psychoanalytic 
jurist Pierre Legendre: ‘How does one cleave to the text, how does 
adhesion to the truth of a text occur, and by what subtle artifice can 
one amorously enjoy a text?’11 By taking it under the covers, through a 
sensuous apprehension of object and content, image and word.
The anecdote provides one of many instances of eros and pain 
thrown together, here in a part object, a synecdoche for the figure of 
a jurist that the youthful Yoshino hoped to become. Richard de Bury 
opines that ‘it is altogether befitting the decency of a scholar, that 
washing should without fail precede reading’, and here the purification 
of sleep, the constancy of the letter, binds subject to book in an amorous 
way, through the attachment mode of object choice. It is a key moment, 
especially if one allows that, again according to de Bury, ‘the master 
love of books’ does not apply to legal texts: ‘an appetite for the books of 
civilians took little hold of our affections’.12 The law book is in general 
‘like the scorpion in treacle’, and so not a fit bedfellow unless the treatise 
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is exceptional, and contains something more than law, a plus ultra or 
amicable purpose, in short a humanism beyond the limited measure 
of secular rules and human will.
In falling in love with a law book, the neophyte lawyer exposes 
both a wound and a longing that are more usually the stuff, as Yoshino 
constantly affirms, of poetry and literature. The jurist’s bibliophilia 
is transitional and marks in the most dramatic of forms a symbolic 
permutation, by which I mean an unconscious scene of capture by law. 
The image of a literal bibliophilia offers at the very least a compelling 
figure of the paradox of juristic initiation, of coming to desire a wisdom 
that is supposedly without desire. Here, specifically, we witness a 
passion that is thrice covered. It is covered by night, hidden by the 
bedcovers, and then secreted again between the sheets, between the 
boards and the reams of the casebook. In this image of dormant book 
and dreaming reader, we can glimpse a passage through the maelstrom 
of law school and the painful rites of initiation into the sect. This was 
the point of entry, the visceral encounter with the institution, and there 
has to be a fissure, a fault, a line of flight, a yoke through which each 
of us passes in coming to terms with law.
For Yoshino — gay and Japanese-American, poetically inclined, 
reticent, uncertain of identity and place — law school, as a student 
and as a professor, was an unwilling askesis, a harsh displacement, a 
painful demand. To go to law school, to join the sect, he had to hide 
in the dark, to sleep with a book, to attend classes covertly, and then 
to cover, meaning not to flaunt his identity, not enact his persona too 
visibly or speak his name too loudly. ‘You’ll have a better chance of 
tenure’, a colleague cautioned him in an off-hour and in a thoroughly 
Foucaultian fashion, ‘if you’re a homosexual professional than if you’re 
a professional homosexual’ (Yoshino 2006: 17). In other words, flaunt 
what you are not, cover who you are. The injunction repeats an antique 
maxim of legal covering that can be culled from Sir Edward Coke: in 
hominis vitium non professionis, it is never the law that fails but only men 
(Coke 1777: A6r-v). Against this curious effacement can be counter-
posed an even more venerable lex amatoria, of which Coke was also 
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aware. It would challenge the maxim as anachronistic and misplaced, 
as too narrow because it is not in the end lex but rather veritas that is 
to be loved and for this, the poets, auctoritates poetarum, are the final 
adjudicators and, in the Greek, nomikoi. It is this fissure or point of 
historical separation that Yoshino traverses and explores.
Covering wields the poets and introduces the lex amatoria to the 
questions of erotic attachment and aesthetic practice that modern law 
has refused to acknowledge and address. Kenji mixes eros and law, 
enfolds poetry and norm. He does so in the form of making the case for 
a civil right, I would say a right to civility, in matters of love, or more 
precisely in all interactions in the intimate public sphere, in the affective 
space where we act out our institutional lives. It is in his terms a right 
to flaunt, meaning simply a liberty, freedom to escape the instituted 
mask, the imposed visage, and so to enact another self. It is a version, 
I think, of what the French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray terms 
an objective right to subjectivity and she argues that as there are two 
sexes so there should be two aesthetic public spheres, and half of the 
space of representation should belong to women (Irigaray 1996). For 
Irigaray the primary legal issue was that of giving objective recognition 
to subjective, and so historically feminine, expressions of creed, taste, 
myth, desire, knowledge and relationship.13 Now Kenji suggests a cross 
cutting but not intrinsically conflicting principle, that of an intimate 
public sphere which suffuses all institutional and political spaces and 
is open to the acting out of whatever erotic identities, sexual personae 
or everyday affective selves subjectivity can invent and invest. What 
was covered should be flaunted.
Adam Phillips (1996) points out that we only flirt with serious 
things — with death, disaster, love, for example — but he makes no 
mention of flaunting. If flirting is a mode of approach and inextricably 
ostensive — I flirt to you, flaunting is existential and habitative. In 
phenomenological terms, to flaunt is to nest in the world, to make 
a place, find a tone, fiat iustitia et pereat mundus as we used to say. 
Whatever its mode, it signals a relation to one’s own being. Flirting is 
epistemological, flaunting is ontological. It is the mode of taking up a 
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social presence, inhabiting a role, an institution, a fate. To flaunt is to 
stage the self, to devise the person, to become an emblem, to demand 
a treatment of one’s own invention, to risk an autonomous authorship 
of how one plays one’s role. No one, to borrow from the Lacanians, 
escapes the institution. That is who we are. Our public selves. The self 
enshrined in the intimate theatre of the public sphere.
Thankfully, the drama of existence displaces law. We deal here 
not with law but with the primary appropriations of identity, name 
and persona, which the Greeks talk of in terms of nomos and which 
include naming, rhythm, poetry, narrative, image and the politics 
of representation as such. Before law, nomos was the discourse of 
the nomikoi, non-lawyers, the bards, the seers, the artists, poets and 
musicians (Crook 1995: 154-8). That is true historically and it is also 
true conceptually. There are better ways of talking, of relating, than 
through court and lawsuits. Kenji reminds us that common law, the 
ipse dixit of judge and jurist, the dreams and fuits of sergeants-at-law, 
are of limited interest when it is not a fee simple – a religious rite 
-- but a flaunting – an erotic undertaking -- that is at issue. There is 
something of a paradox here, in that Yoshino doesn’t fully abandon 
the religious rites and languages of law. He still wants to talk about 
civil rights and egregious cases, the non-poetic but that discussion, and 
this is the signal achievement of Yoshino’s Covering, namely that he 
drifts beyond the antagonism, desiccation and thorough incompetence 
of juristic attempts to address affective and erotic interactions. They 
will never get us very far and that is why the book is addressed beyond 
the legal academy, beyond the academic audience and engages a much 
more diverse set of disciplines. Kenji carves out a public intellectual 
sphere, a positive and yet precarious space of intimate dialogue within 
the margins of the academy and the border of the market forces that 
must in part have imposed the cover imagery and imaginations. The 
point is that to an impressive though certainly not over extensive degree, 
Yoshino embodies and enacts what he argues. The book does not, as 
a matter of style or aesthetic genre, cover so much as it flaunts. Here 
a lawyer, a scholar in charge of ‘intellectual life’ at Yale Law School, 
a jurist, addresses poetry and portraiture, sleepless nights, anxious 
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reveries, dark off-hours, phantasms, in a work that is also a tract on 
civil rights, normative arguments and legal cases. It is precisely in this 
mixture of modes, this mediation, that he uncovers, expresses and, so 
be it, mirabile dictu, he flaunts.
Lastly, third point, envoi in the trinity, the question of the uncovered 
itself, the matter of the wounds revealed, the tears shed. A certain 
caution is necessary. As Bury puts it in his amorous address to books 
all those years ago, and yet the lesson is perhaps not entirely absorbed:
there must be a most mature decorum in the opening and closing of 
volumes, that they may neither be unclasped with precipitous haste, 
nor thrown aside after inspection without being duly closed; for it is 
necessary that a book should be much more carefully preserved than 
a shoe (Bury 1345/1832: 71).
Exactly so. The cover, as Burton reminded us, is there for a purpose. So 
too I imagine, and by extension, the person and persona or contemporary 
mask deserve a similar caritas, this same decorum and love. Who 
have we become? I dwelt at length upon the cover of Covering for the 
very reason that the cover and clothes, what used to be termed the 
‘lineaments of language’, namely elocution, should be examined as 
carefully and cautiously as the face that utters the words. The apparently 
commercial representation of the book, with its colours and blurbs, 
image and title, belong within a genre that interfaces very directly 
with the normative argument that the book endeavours to make at 
multiple levels. The cover covers, it expresses, it hides, it is somewhat 
enigmatic, a little cryptic, a touch hyperbolic, and yet also revealing and 
indicative in showing the body, the partially covered and coloured face 
of the author. The visage as vestige, the face as damage, the subject of 
time’s harrow. The cover of the book indeed marks, it veils and reveals, 
seduces and abandons, flirts and flaunts, which leads to the question of 
the cover as a wound, a scar that marks the imposition of the institution 
and the demands of the publisher.
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Conclusion
How does the book end? Entry for content, exit for style. Nor can we 
assume the juristic priority of the former over the latter. Quite the 
contrary. Last things are end states, goals, achievements. So, I came 
to the epilogue. It starts with the poem ‘Blue Star’ by Philip Levine. 
‘Show me the place,’ it begins, where a tiny blue star nestles above the 
heart. The star is unusual. It is examined by doctors. Surgery follows. 
The star is removed but under it we find ‘another perfect star’. ‘What 
does it mean?’, this star that will not be excised, that replicates, that 
forms an indelible tattoo. The answer is as indexical and complex as 
the pronoun ‘you’. Last line, ending and opening: ‘It could mean this 
is who you are’ (Yoshino 2006: 198).
The star transpires to be permanent. It is part of the human carapace, 
it is in the skin, part of the last and irreducible cover. So don’t cut the 
star away, don’t erase or mutilate the cover, respect the astral as sign, 
as face, as real. Professor Yoshino discusses the poem as an emblem 
of a particular relationship, as a marker of ambivalent passion, as 
hope against hope, and then shifts to reminisce about the wedding of 
a friend. She has a tattoo of a blue star at the tip of her left shoulder 
blade. He can see it now, above the wedding gown. In times past, as 
a graduate student, Kenji had fought her over the tattoo. It was in his 
view too indelible. Its unnecessary permanence bound her future to 
a younger and impermanent self. But it is still there on her wedding 
day, a beacon to her commitment to poetry, to writing and to writing 
on the body. Yoshino looks back on those youthful enthusiasms, that 
formative argument, and admits that he was wrong. Last words, closing 
of the book, exit for style: ‘I still dislike tattoos. Except for this one, 
which I love out of mind.’ Closing words, final remark, exeunt omnes. 
To which, for completion, and to get back to the cover, the reference 
to time out of mind is of course to common law, to time immemorial, 
beyond memory of man, out of mind. A lovely notion, little understood, 
and full of poetic significances. Here Yoshino takes it up and makes it 
literature, turns a little piece of argot, a maxim of law, into lyric.14 That 
is the promise and the gift produced by challenging demands to cover.
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As for me, the eccentric white commentator, the Anglican critic, 
the covered male, I put the book down, last words at the end of a long 
process of slow reading and my eyes welled with tears. I became a 
woman. Others have said the same, but privately. Generally they were 
women. So I will simply confess that law books have not on the whole 
touched me to tears. It was a surprise, an engagement, a moment of 
attachment, reflected no doubt also in my tendency occasionally to drift 
into sleep, to revert to dreaming, while reading. I was moved, the poetry 
bent me, it touched what might be termed my melancholic body. To 
borrow from Tertullian, I became gently morose. This has a juridical 
significance that can be traced initially to theological dogma and the 
rules that governed weeping. Christian doctrine prohibited tears. 
That expression of emotion was to be covered. Thus for Tertullian, for 
example, author of De Spectaculis, to laugh and to weep, both sources of 
tears, were alike impermissible in Christian worship. His text is an early 
condemnation of theatre, games, spectacles and ‘public shows’ more 
generally (Tertullian 1869 edn). Laughter, jesting, tears and dance were 
all deemed excessive in a religious tradition that demanded silent, and 
above all, serious worship, both quietude of the body and composure of 
the mind. The Church Fathers thus distinguished between actual and 
mystical tears and ordained that all weeping should be internal, that 
tears should be swallowed, covered over and turned into prayer. The 
Decretals, to take another key example, declares that ‘To weep for the 
dead originates in meanness’ and subsequent edicts banned weeping 
women from funerals for that reason.15 Tears collapse the face and, 
to use a more contemporary and here topical idiom, they blow your 
cover. They release. They leak. They shift the interior to the exterior. 
Christianity refuses to let go of what is lost, it will not mourn, and 
in refusing to mourn remains in a state of melancholia, attentive and 
morose, waiting for the advent of another and better life (Allestree 
1671). Hence the catharsis of tears and the benefit, the excitement and 
the transformation generated by reading the book. Covering, for me, did 
something that even Nietzsche deemed pretty much impossible. It was 
a book that did not lead directly to more books but rather led to tears.
Tears, within the doctrinal tradition inherited by law, are contrasted 
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to the purity of stoic dry eyes, and hence they are excessive, feminine, 
emotional and altogether too contagious and vivid. Theologically they 
suggest pagan passions, excess and enthusiasm, the latter being a term 
derived from the Greek for possession by a God, religious frenzy, and 
so illicit communion with the spirit world.16  In sum, tears flaunt the 
fact of having covered, they expose the very moment of hiding the 
undesired identity and so offer the opportunity of bringing the alternate 
self to presence. Public tears enact a rite of commemoration, they are 
an instance of shedding, of displaying in an irreducibly physical and 
ambivalently fluid form a sense of loss that both galvanizes the face 
that weeps and offers a species of illocutionary act.
We have to believe that tears are not wasted.  They are in and of the 
body, a property, a mark, a sign of the affect of presence and meaning. 
They have a place and function, a role in the ceremony of release, as 
also in the rite of interpretation. In positive terms I thus mourned a 
loss, I let go of a tear, I loosed a shard of memory. Here is a secret, a 
connection I finally made between Kenji’s trauma and my own tears. 
It took me back to childhood and to my struggle to avoid returning to 
boarding school at the age of eleven. I feigned stomach ache and ended 
up having my appendix removed. The institution claimed an organ, 
although it also claimed, and this was back in the excision happy sixties, 
that the organ was not a necessary one. Now, years on, the story of the 
star and its removal dislodged a memory of my institutional trauma and 
my own scar, a thin line of skin that cannot feel, and which over forty 
years on I still carry. It is a mark, branded on my flesh, an indelible 
part of my cover, my carapace. An originary writing, an incision, a 
wound. And so the tear. I flaunted to myself and now more obviously 
to the world. In doing so, in repeating the experience in prose, I have 
uncovered a fragment of identity that would not normally be in view. 
In theory I should repress the memory, talk about something else, act 
a bit more like a jurist than a child, a weeper. There is a doctrine of 
tears that precisely dictates their repression, an epistemic of weeping 
that views crying as weakness or excess, as feminine and dissolute. In 
scholarly jargon, tears are external to juristic cognition and irrelevant to 
a critical reading of a normative text, however decorously and carefully 
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one seeks to treat it, however hidden in the conclusion the tears may be.
Returning to my epigraph and the wit and wisdom of Giacomo 
Casanova, flâneur and flauntër par excellence, this essay has evidenced 
the pervasiveness of covering and the desire to flaunt that lurks, 
repressed or just occasionally, in legal contexts, expressed by poets such 
as Yoshino and satirists such as I. Flaunting, to be juridically admissible, 
must be acclamatory and institutional, a choral function of selling the 
legal life, the way of the institution, the path of the covered soul. From 
publisher’s marketing departments to Law School Public Relations 
offices, institutional advancement and fundraising literature, there is a 
well-developed science of glossy brochures, satisfied smiles and all those 
other pretty signs — the contemporary inundation of photos, postcards, 
visual announcements, invitations, magazines, letters both actual and 
virtual. We have to learn to read these critically, along with all the 
other juridical and judicial symbols whose unwitting use might cause 
compromise of role and self. Covering makes a remarkable introduction 
to this process of aesthetic and affective apprehension of legality writ 
large and small, portrayed in the portraits on the classroom wall, the 
magazines in the mailboxes and the other more formal stagings of 
scholastic ceremony. Amidst all this glory, Yoshino traces the wounds, 
the imposed roles, the compromises against which Casanova had so 
lightly warned. What Kenji expresses is an intense and very acute 
sense of the intimate laws of the institution, the training in manners 
and examinations, in self-presentation and scholarly style, that are as 
much a part of what is learned at school, in the process of becoming 
a follower, a lawyer, as the explicit rules contained within the blank 
and imageless boards of the casebooks, hornbooks and treatises. The 
discipline also disciplines and that is peculiarly true of law.
Whatever the occasion of initiation, however, the lawbook will 
equally run the gauntlet between tears and laughter, frustration and 
insight, love and hate. For Casanova, the purpose of the history of his 
life, the intimate narrative of a public trajectory, was to amuse and 
bring laughter. On the inverse, Nemo laeditur nisi a seipso — we are the 
artisans of our own sorrows. This is the classical, emblematic choice, the 
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confrontation of Heraclitus and Democritus, their opposition and their 
enfolding, their antinomic jointure. Uncovering, the choice elaborated 
by Yoshino, the path traversed in this essay, is in the end a matter of 
mingling, of the flux between two species of tears, those of sorrow and 
laughter, memory and hope, lachrymae iuris and hilaritas, the latter 
representing a more dialogic and somewhat dissonant interior law. In 
Yoshino’s epilogue, it is a symbol on the body, a mark in the mode of a 
tattoo that best represents this hilaritas. It frightened Kenji or at least 
invoked his youthful disapproval. But now, years on, a professor of law, 
the star on the back, and the poem about its permanence, duration and 
enfolding of youth in age, becomes his envoi. A book can have images 
on its cover, and a body can have figures, colours — symbola heroica — 
on its skin. These are in the end unavoidable incidents of being in the 
market, of living in a body. They are, in Casanova’s terms, expressions 
of the uncompromised role, moments of authentic theatre in which the 
self plays out its own part, its phantasm, its proper mask. By the same 
token, a legal text has images enfolded in its prose, poetry mingled 
with its rules,  meaning and rhyme mixed with method and rhythm.
Notes
1 Thanks diversely and severally to Joe Brooker, Marianne Constable, Simon 
Critchley, Anselm Haverkamp, Bill MacNeil, Mark Sanders, Kevin Stack, 
Julie Suk, Chuck Yablon, Peter Rush, and Kenji Yoshino variously for 
ideas, comments, opportunities, suggestions, and for silence when there 
was nothing to say. Especial thanks to Linda Mills for her inimitable carte 
de tendre.
2 Selden (1610) has a woodcut of Janus on the title page. The translation 
of the book in Selden (1683), also uses this image on the title page. The 
motto is Haec facies Populum spectat; at illa larum, which picks up on the 
treatment of Janus in the legal emblem books of that century which treat 
the deity as guardian of the law, looking inside and out, at the oeconomic 
and the providential.
3 The image of Janus is used, for example, on the cover of Goodrich (1995).
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4 My thanks to Thanos Zartaloudis for originally pointing this out to me and 
for discussing its significance. In fact, for the sake of precision, it will here 
be noted that there are a few solitary figures in the city: a soldier guards 
the castle wall, some other soldiers are marching in the main square, but 
they are alone, the city is empty, they are guarding an idea. For additional 
discussion, see Lawler (2009).
5 As, for example, Hobbes (1968) edited by C B Macpherson and published 
by Penguin.
6 Classification and shelving of files and books is also a subject that lacks 
much analysis. Cornelia Vismann (2007) makes a start in filling that gap.
7 One of the readers for Law Text Culture politely suggested that the 
reference to ‘gay science’ be explained so as not to seem to flaunt an 
adverse connotation. The reference is Rabelesian and to the gay scientist 
‘sans culottes’, an anarchistic and amorous figure, discussed in the fondly 
admired but little noted P Goodrich (2006).
8 The maxim, meaning the face is the index of the soul, is standard. See 
Richard Head (1675). He continues: ‘The face is the index of the mind; yet 
experience tells us it is no infallible indicium of the nature or disposition 
of the person … [for] always to see, is not to know’.
9  The reference to erudition in eroticis is to Friedrich Neitzsche (1916) at 
53.
10 Richard de Bury (1345/1832: 18) notes that ‘if anything whatever, 
according to a degree of value deserves a degree of love’ then it is the 
ineffable value of books that fills that role as object of desire. Much later, 
Emanuel Levinas (1969: 254) notes that ‘a thing, an abstraction, a book 
can likewise be objects of love’.
11 Pierre Legendre (1982: 46). For commentary, see Stephanie Lysyk (2006).
12 Richard de Bury (1345/1832: 56-7)
13 These issues can be pursued further in Luce Irigary (1995). For discussion 
of this and other themes, see P Goodrich (1993:43).
14 The maxim is given, for example, in Sir Edward Coke (1629: 115a): Longum 
tempus et longus usus, qui excedit memoriam hominum, sufficit pro jure [Long 
time and long use, which exceeds the memory of men, is sufficient in law].
15 Decretals rubric of canon 26, cause 13, question 2.
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16 The best discussion of this dimension of the doctrine of tears can be found 
in Edward Stillingfleete (1662) who lists seriousness in all matters of 
worship as the third law of nature covering all manner of government.
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